[Question:]{.underline} Is it a mortal sin to vote for a pro-abortion candidate?
[Answer:]{.underline} The casting of a vote can be a virtuous act, even in our modern liberal democracies, in which so much of the system is not only opposed to our holy religion, but even to the natural law itself. However, for a vote to be a virtuous act, it must necessary be directed towards its end, namely the common good. Consequently, it is in itself a grave sin to vote for a unworthy candidate, for the choice of a candidate whose life or policies are immoral is an illicit cooperation in bringing about a grave evil on society. There can be no doubt that abortion, the murder of the innocent, is one of the greatest evils afflicting modern society, and that it is crying out to heaven for vengeance. Consequently, there can not in itself be any justification for voting for any candidate who is pro-abortion, or in any way tolerant of abortion.
The question arises, however, as to whether there could be sufficient reason for vote for a candidate who might consent to some abortions, for example to avoid a more serious evil, such as to defeat a candidate who might be in favor of homosexual marriages or who might actively promote abortions or some other great evil, such as unjust wars.
The theologians answer that the act of casting a vote is a material cooperation in the evil that that candidate might cause, and not necessarily a formal cooperation (Cf. Prummer, III, §604). This means that the person who casts the vote is not necessarily directly responsible for what a bad candidate might do once elected, even if he foresaw that he would perform some evil deeds. In such cases of material cooperation, the Church allows the application of the principles of the indirect voluntary. It is permissible, since the act of casting a vote is not in itself bad, and the end is good, namely to avoid a greater evil. However, there must a very grave reason to justify such material cooperation, and all scandal would have to be avoided. This could be the case, for example, if a person were to vote for a Protestant whose platform was in general in accordance with the natural law, but who might have some false principles concerning divorce or the funding of Catholic schools, or on some environmental issue. In such a case, it would be permissible to chose the lesser evil, and to vote for a candidate who is not entirely good, on the condition that there is a very grave reason, namely to avoid a much greater evil.
The question here as to whether there could ever possibly be such a grave reason that could justify a person voting for a pro-abortion candidate. Is it possible for there to be a greater evil that could justify such a participation in this evil of abortion, even only a material participation? I cannot conceive that this could be possible, for abortion is such a perverse and horrible crime.
It is be possible to conceive of a greater evil that would allow one to vote for a candidate who would accept (unwillingly) abortions under certain exceptional circumstances such as rape, for this is frequently done in order to prevent the election of a candidate who is positively pro-abortion. This is a frequent occurrence, and is certainly permissible. However, it is inconceivable that a Catholic would vote for a politician who is positively pro-abortion simply because he likes his tax scheme or his social policies. In such an instant there would be no proportion at all, and it would certainly be a grave sin, even if the intention were only for a material cooperation.
If in general it is narrow-minded to be a single issue voter, this certainly does not apply to the abortion question. The common good absolutely and necessary requires the abolition of abortions from public life, and it is of such overwhelming importance for the good of society, that no person could be considered imprudent for voting on the basis of this question alone.
[Question:]{.underline} Why is it that Catholics adore the wood of the Cross, but they do not adore Mary?
[Answer:]{.underline} The adoration that is due to God is termed latria or divine worship. It is absolutely owed to God Himself, and hence to the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity and to Our Lord Jesus Christ. We adore Christ on the Cross as in his glorious Resurrection. Clearly, we do not adore the wood of the Cross in the same way, since it is but a creature. However, inasmuch as the wood of the Cross is directly and immediately related to our Divine Savior, whose Precious Blood sanctified it and made it the sweet wood that bears the salvation of the world, it must also be honored. Consequently, we owe the wood of the Cross a relative adoration. We adore it inasmuch as it is related to the Person of our Divine Savior, that is inasmuch as he died for our sins on this wood. However, the worship of latria is not directed to the wood, but to our divine Lord.
The veneration that we owe to the Holy Mother of God is called hyperdulia, meaning that it is greater than the veneration owed to all the saints put together, on account of her fullness of grace and perfect holiness. She also is holy because of her relation to Our Divine Savior, and it is her divine Motherhood that is the basic of all her other prerogatives. Nevertheless, the veneration of hyperdulia that we owe to her is not a relative one, but an absolute one. We do not adore her as God, but we venerate her for who she is, whereas we adore the Cross only because it is Our Divine Savior’s cross, by which He redeemed the world.
Hence it is perfectly true to say that we adore the wood of the Cross, but we do not adore Mary, although she is infinitely greater than the wood of the Cross considered in itself.
[Question:]{.underline} Is it permissible to embark on a hunger strike, determined to fast until death if one’s non-violent political action is not successful?
[Answer:]{.underline} The essential question to be resolved here is whether embarking on a hunger strike is to commit suicide or not. Suicide is defined as “the direct killing of oneself on one’s own authority” (Fagothey, Right and Reason, p. 276).
Suicide is to be distinguished from indirect killing, which is only indirectly voluntary, for death is not intended either as an end or as a means to an end, but is only permitted as an unavoidable consequence. Such is the case of deliberate exposure of one’s life to serious danger of death. This is certainly permissible, but only on condition that the usual rules of the indirect voluntary or double effect apply, namely that the bad effect of death is quite distinct from the good effect that is desired, that the good effect does not come from the bad effect, and that there is a proportionate reason to justify the bad effect that is permitted as an unavoidable consequence. This it is permitted to permitted to place one’s life in danger in time of war, in order to defend one’s country, even knowing that there is a good chance that one would be killed. However, it is never permitted to directly kill oneself, even for one’s country, for it is the evil effect of killing oneself which is desired in itself, and the good effect comes from it. This is always wrong, for the ends do not justify the means. Thus suicide bombers certainly commit immoral acts when they kill themselves in order to kill others. They cannot be said to act in virtue of the principle of double effect.
The gravity of the sin of suicide lies in the fact that it is a directly voluntary act, in which it is one’s own death that is intended either as an end, or as a means to an end. This is directly against the natural law, know to all men by their very nature, for by nature we are God’s and he has exclusive dominion over us. It is in the natural law that man, who is subject to God and dependent upon Him for everything, does not have direct or absolute control over himself, but only stewardship. For there is no other way for man to attain his end than by belonging to Almighty God, which a man refuses by attributing to himself God’s right over life and death.
A hunger strike is direct suicide. It is death itself that is desired, in order to obtain a political change. It is a direct killing of oneself, which is always wrong, regardless of the good that one hopes to attain thereby. It is consequently always a mortal sin, regardless of the political gain that could be expected. The only exception to this would be if a person had a revelation from God, indicating that it is God’s will for him to kill himself, so that it would be an act of obedience and submission to the Author of life, rather than an act of rebellion. A person who thought he had such a revelation could possibly be in good Faith. However, if he were sane, he would still have to be refused Catholic burial, on account of the scandal caused. Furthermore, it is not reasonable to believe that God would ever give such a command, so directly opposed to the natural law, upon which grace and divine Revelation build.
Answered by Father Peter Scott, SSPX.